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Narrating le vivant: the Zoe-Poetical Hypothesis
Prolegomena: Navigating around Words, Labels and Languages
Animal and environmental studies are marked by a wide variety of labels 
urging anyone engaging with these areas of study to take a stance on the 
use of relevant terms such as animal studies or zoopoetics, environmental/
green studies or environmental/green humanities, ecocriticism or ecopoetics. 
Such lexical proliferation arguably attests to a still on-going process of self-
definition and sharpening of distinctions, including the one between North 
American and other national academic contexts and methodologies. For 
instance, the current preference in French academia for the terms “zoo-” and 
“eco- poetics” over terms like “animal studies,” “environmental studies,” or 
“ecocriticism” aims to reaffirm the centrality of the text, while it simultane-
ously indicates the persistence of formalist inheritance as well as a distancing 
from cultural studies which is still regarded with a sort of defiance in France.1 
It might also appear as a symptom of a certain uneasiness, which could be 
explained by the fact that the anthropocentric patterns of Western languages 
are not entirely suitable for naming the tenets and perspectives which animal 
and environmental scholars are interested in. In this regard, French philoso-
pher Jacques Derrida’s condemnation of the concept of “the animal” in its 
singular form as misleading, anthropocentric, and ultimately dangerous has 
become milestone for those who are interested in the question.2 
1 Cf. Simon (“Quelle place pour l’animal”), or Blanc, Chartier, and Pughe.
2 In his now famous ten-hour address given at the 1997 Cerisy-la-Salle conference, Der-
rida blamed the term for its anthropocentrism, saying: “[A] notion as general as ‘the 
Animal,’ as if all nonhuman living things could be groups without the common sense of 
this ‘commonplace’, the Animal, whatever the abyssal differences and structural limits 
that separate, in the very essence of their being, all ‘animals’, [is] a name that we would 
therefore be advised, to begin with, to keep within quotation marks. Confined within 
this catch-all concept, within this vast encampment of the animal, in this general singular, 
within the strict enclosure of this definite article … are all the living things that man does 
not recognize as his fellow, his neighbors, or his brothers” (“Animal” 402). In Derrida’s 
view, the monolithic concept of “the Animal” then reactivates the dualism in which the 
thesis of human exceptionalism originates and proves to be inherently loaded with an-
thropocentrism. Rather, one should talk of “animot”—a portmanteau combining the two 
French terms animal and mot (“word”) as well as phonetically echoing the French plural 
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The word “environment” has likewise been the subject of similar cri-
tiques, although less frequently quoted. As early as 1989, Michel Serres 
recommended to forget the word “environment” which, coined after the 
Latin word viron meaning circle, “implies that we human beings are the heart 
of a complex system in which things evolve around us, center of the uni-
verse, masters and owners of nature [and thus] recalls a bygone era when 
geocentrism reflected our narcissism, as we despised the world”3 (5). Such 
criticism was echoed by Cheryll Glotfelty in 1996—“in its connotation, envi-
ro- is anthropocentric and dualistic, implying that we humans are the center, 
surrounded by everything that is not us, the environment” (xx)—yet it does 
not seem to have gained a wide audience in the English-speaking world 
and academia, as evidenced by the numerous “literature and environment” 
university programs or by the very name of The Association for the Study of 
Literature and Environment (ASLE), unchanged since its foundation in 1992.
The new terminology brought forth by the use of prefixes like “zoo-” and 
“eco-” surely provides a way to reduce the anthropocentric echoes of older 
terms. But like the former formulas, it keeps stressing what distinguishes the 
two fields under scrutiny in this volume rather than it helps us think about 
the ways which they might share and co-articulate. First, the opposition these 
labels echo outside the literary field—notably in ethics4—tends to map out two 
different territories suggesting that one would find “animal people” on one 
side, and “nature people” (those interested in and caring for trees, plants, 
for animal which is animaux—so that homogenization (and its corollary violence) would be 
avoided: “I would like to have the plural of animals heard in the general singular. There 
is no animal in the general singular, separated from man by a single indivisible limit. We 
have to envisage the existence of ‘living creatures’ whose plurality cannot be assembled 
within the single feature of an animality that is simply opposed to humanity…. Among 
non-humans and separate from nonhumans there is an immense multiplicity of other living 
things that cannot be homogenized, except by means of violence and willingful ignorance, 
within the category of what is called the animal or animality in general. From the outset 
there are animals and, let’s say, l’animot. The confusion of all nonhuman living creatures 
within the general and common category of the animals is not simply a sin against rigorous 
thinking, vigilance, lucidity, or empirical authority; it is also a crime” (“Animal” 415-16).
3 “[Le terme d’environnement] suppose que nous autres hommes siégeons au centre d’un 
système de choses qui gravitent autour de nous, nombrils de l’univers, maîtres et pos-
sesseurs de la nature [et] rappelle une ère révolue où le modèle géocentré reflétait notre 
narcissisme, manière de mépriser le monde.” If not indicated otherwise, all translations 
from the French are my own.
4 In English-speaking cultures, the political field historically distinguishes between animal 
welfare and ethics on the one hand and environmentalism on the other hand. In contrast, 
the French-speaking world does not duplicate such discrimination (cf. Delanoy). 
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mountains, rivers, etc.) on the other side, confronting one another with of-
ten irreconciliable logics.5 Most of the time though, the distinction between 
zoopoetics/zoocriticism and ecopoetics/ecocriticism happens to be formulated 
in terms of either focus or scale—ecocriticism usually being granted with an 
interest in larger-scale systems, inclusive of (but not limited to) individual 
animal organisms. From this point of view, zoopoetics/zoocriticism and eco-
poetics/ecocriticism do overlap.6 However, even with such careful handling 
of notions, misunderstandings are not far off.
One critical issue appears to lie in the recurring tendency to give priority 
to specific objects of study in the process of defining fields (e.g., animals for 
zoopoetics) whereas one of the main contributions of ecological thinking—the 
one that makes ecology a “subversive science” according to Paul Shepard 
and Daniel McKinley—is precisely to depart from a substantive ontology of 
objects and to replace it with an understanding of reality that claims the pri-
macy and prominence of relationships.7 Insofar as one remembers the origi-
nal meaning Ernst Haeckel gave the word “ecology” in 1866—that is, “the 
whole science of the relations of the organism to the environment including, 
in the broad sense, all the ‘conditions of existence’” (transl. in Stauffer 140; 
emphasis added)—the prefix “eco-” stands as a marker of a relational ontol-
ogy rather than a morpheme referring to natural objects.8 From this point 
of view, tensions between zoopoetics and ecopoetics turn out to be not so 
much about a binary opposition of their objects of study than a discrepancy 
between two different logics and ontologies (substantive versus relational). 
Aiming at exploring a permeable relationship between the two fields, I 
would like to propose the neologism “zoe-poetics” as an alternative label 
likely to combine the semantic extension of “zoo-”—zoion in plural form, mean-
ing all animated creatures—with the non-substantive, non-discrete perspec-
tive that the prefix “eco-” originally refers to. Drawing mostly on the French 
academic context where animal studies and ecocriticism have developed as 
5 On this matter, cf., for instance, Callicott, “Animal liberation.”
6 Cf. Buell, Heise, and Thornber (430-33) or “the borderland ecocriticism shares, mainly 
amicably, with critical animal studies” mentioned by Garrard (4).
7 Cf., for instance, Callicott: “The ontological primacy of objects and the ontological sub-
ordination of relationship characteristic of classical Western science is, in fact, reversed in 
ecology. Ecological relationships determine the nature of organisms rather than the other 
way around” (Defense 87).
8 That meaning was lost in the English use of “ecology” according to David R. Keller and 
Frank B. Golley who argue that “the term’s broad current usage reflects little of its origin 
as it has turned into a synonym for nature or environment” (3). 
Animal St Bd 3 Print.indd   73 09.12.18   16:20
74 Marie Cazaban-Mazerolles
a joint project,9 I will first define and characterize theoretically “zoepoet-
ics” as a poetics the object of which is not animals or environments but le 
vivant, understood as a name endorsing an eco-ontological view of all living 
creatures. I will argue that promoting such an integrative (albeit selective) 
approach ultimately allows to enlighten the critical power which zoo-poetics 
and eco-poetics can share in terms of a posthumanist discourse that not only 
challenges the idea of human exceptionalism but also the myth of man’s 
autonomy. Finally, I will examine one of the few practical challenges zoepoetics 
may pose when considering the issue of narrative representation by looking 
at French contemporary writer Éric Chevillard’s Sans l’orang-outan. 
Zoe and le vivant: Contributions from Ancient Greek and French Languages
At the end of the last century, Giorgio Agamben (3-15) reminded a large 
audience that the Greeks had two different names for the one and only 
“life”: bios and zoe. Although one cannot but credit the Italian philosopher 
for bringing back to light such a widely forgotten distinction, the way he 
framed it has endorsed the equation of zoe and “bare life,” understood as a 
somehow reduced, lesser, excluded form of life in the context of biopolitics.10 
However, a valuable 1976 essay about Dionysian worship by the mytholo-
gist Karl Kerényi reminds us of the original distinction between zoe and bios: 
The word zoë … resounds with the life of living creatures. The significance of zoë 
is life in general, without further characterization. When the word bios is uttered, 
something else resounds: the contours, as it were, the characteristic traits of a 
specified life, the outlines that distinguish one living thing from another…. If I 
may employ an image for the relationship between [bios and zoë], … zoë is the thread 
upon which every individual bios is strung like a bead, and which, in contrast to 
bios, can be conceived of only as endless (xxxii, xxxv).
Because such a definition emphasizes the contrast between bios as the name 
for a distinct, separated life on the one hand and zoe used to refer to a 
continuous life that evades differentiation in time and space as well as on a 
9 Cf. Simon (“Animality”): “[R]esearch in France has tended, from the start of its reflec-
tions on animality, to connect this question to the environmental question, whereas in the 
English-speaking world, animal studies and ecocriticism have developed separately” (79).
10 Cf. the criticism formulated by Derrida in his last seminar The Beast and the Sovereign (315-
33); or Rosi Braidotti’s reprobation about “the being-aliveness of the subject (zoē) [being] 
identified with its perishability, its propensity and vulnerability to death and extinction” 
(206).
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metaphysical level (zoe does not draw lines between any of the living crea-
tures according to their alleged spiritual nature) on the other, it allows us 
to regard it as a proto-Darwinian and proto-ecological concept endorsing a 
non-discrete view on life—a perspective also conveyed by le vivant in contem-
porary scientific discourse. If the concept—which Barbara Cassin described 
as untranslatable11—is hard to define, it is indeed currently understood as 
the name for the specific topic life sciences are preoccupied with. It has thus 
spread since the sixties as a way to depart from the vitalism still implied 
by “la vie” which is considered, in its substantive form, as a “metaphysi-
cal residue inherited from old-fashioned theological and animist doctrines 
despised by positive sciences”12 (Hoquet 15) and incrementally expelled as 
such by modern biosciences.13 Instead, the term le vivant now encapsulates a 
post-Darwinian view on life which takes ecological aspects into account but 
also tries to distance itself from any metaphysical, historical and synchronic 
separations between all organisms; a distancing which the ancient Greek zoe, 
by insisting on the pattern of indistinctness, had actually been anticipating. 
Both zoe and le vivant then support a vision that not only challenges 
anthropocentrism (as well as zoocentrism and its coterminous exclusion of 
mushrooms, bacteria and plants) insofar as it aims not to distinguish between 
animate beings but which also questions what has been demeaned by British 
philosopher Anthony Quinton as an obsolete Newtonian ontology: 
In [the Newtonian conception] the world consists of an array of precisely demar-
cated individual things or substances, which preserve their identity through time, 
occupy definite positions in space, have their own essential natures independently 
of their relations to anything else, and fall into clearly distinct natural kinds. Such 
a world resembles a warehouse of automobile parts. (qtd. in Callicott, Defense 105)
By contrast, and despite the representations language imprint upon our 
minds, a genuine ecological vision intends to blur boundaries: 
Because we learn to talk at the same time we learn to think, our language, for 
example, encourages us to see ourselves—or a plant or animal—as an isolated sack, 
a thing, a contained self. Ecological thinking, on the other hand, requires a kind of 
vision across boundaries. The epidermis of the skin is ecologically like a pond sur-
face or a forest soil, not a shell so much as a delicate interpenetration. (Shepard 2)
11 Compare also Stephanie Posthumus’ contribution in this volume.
12 “[L]a vie elle-même n’est plus qu’un nom, scorie métaphysique héritée des doctrines 
théologiques et d’un animisme dont la science positive n’a que faire” (Hoquet 15).
13 French physician Claude Bernard, pioneer of modern biology and medicine, thus had 
unambiguously claimed (291): “la vie n’est qu’un mot qui veut dire ignorance.” 
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Here, one again finds the vocabulary already used by Kerényi to describe 
zoe and depicting life as a mesh (cf. Morton 15) that cannot be confined to 
the punctum of any individual organism. Assuming a non-discrete concept of 
life, le vivant attempts to avoid the tendency to essentialize separate objects, 
which is still implicit in terms such as “nature,” “animal,” or “environment.” 
Therefore, a zoepoetics may stand as including zoion and eco to the extent that 
it endorses a non-Newtonian, non-essentialist and ultimately non-discrete 
ontology. As Stephanie Posthumus suggested in a talk given at the University 
of Angers in May 2015 (to be published), one may arguably contend that 
the concept of le vivant enables to develop an ecocriticism that focuses less on 
differences, pointing out an alternative way likely to reduce the gap between 
animal studies and ecocriticism in the English-speaking world. 
Experimenting with Non-Discretion:  
The Example of Éric Chevillard’s Sans l’orang-outan
When confronting such a theoretical framework with the study of literary 
texts, one is nonetheless back in a deadlock situation. Is not the faculty to 
distinguish and draw lines indeed the very condition for figurative repre-
sentation? Is individuality not the very premise shaping characters?14 In 
his etymological survey, Kerényi hence noticed that bios, not zoe, is the one 
and only life that can be told in narratives: “Bios [is] the content of each 
individual man’s written and unwritten biography.” In contrast to that, zoe is 
“the life with which biology first begins,” intended to be explored by science 
but inherently out of the reach of literary narratives: “The experience of that 
life which resounded for the Greeks in the word zoë is, on the other hand, 
indescribable” (xxxv). Yet, the neologism zoepoetics aims at challenging such 
epistemic division, emphasizing the creativity of literary language to invent 
successful ways to represent le vivant as a non-discrete form of life that cuts 
across time and space. 
Contemporary French writer Eric Chevillard’s Sans l’orang-outan, pub-
lished in 2007, provides an accurate albeit extreme example of the issues 
raised by ecological ontology, especially when it comes to the representation 
of (human and nonhuman) animals. The book takes its reader to the mo-
ment of the (still) imaginary extinction of the great apes that gives the novel 
its title, the two last specimens of which have just died at the opening of the 
14 On this issue of Western conceptions of literary characters being patterned after a Carte-
sian view of the self as an autonomous and self-reflexive ego, cf. Boerher 9-10.
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tale. Yet such a disappearance is not described as creating an absence as much 
as it turns out to affect the human protagonists in their own bodies. To exist 
without orangutans is to exist “without arms or legs, as if one would sud-
denly suffer an amputation of several limbs”15 (Chevillard 16). The whole 
first part of the narrative is thus dedicated to register the metamorphosis 
human bodies and existences go through, disclosing in a negative way the 
solidarity that used to bind orangutans and Homo sapiens together: 
[W]e are meant to live with orangutans, on one territory where we share the work, 
where we exchange favors and expertise in constant interaction. For we share the 
same destiny for eternity. If one of us is missing, the other one then loses half of 
his limbs whereas his task becomes twice as big. Here he is: A hemiplegic man 
asked to hull green peas.16 (Chevillard 153)
In other words, the ape had been coterminous to the human being whose 
self had never been autonomous—it used to be merged with the self of the 
animal and vice versa. In that respect, Chevillard’s narrative endorses a view 
of identity and individuality consistent with the axioms of deep ecology: 
“[O]ne’s own self  is no longer adequately delimited by the personal ego or 
the organism” (Naess 174). In this book, Chevillard does picture his hu-
man protagonists as outlined, discrete, separated figures isolated from other 
animals, but this condition is concomitantly displayed as the pathological 
result of a decomposition, as the by-product of fateful cut into the continu-
ous entanglement of life: “Our body experiments with all the ways to be 
crippled—and there are a lot of ways”17 (22). 
Reversing the old nineteenth-century anxiety about hybridity that took 
hold of literary narratives in the wake of the Darwinian revolution,18 Chevil-
lard then displays the experience of purity as a negative one. In his narrative, 
human beings resent their only-human bodies. They are coping with an 
ontological solipsism emphasized through the use of many phrases referring 
to the newly autotelic human condition: “I can slap myself, twist my own 
15 “[S]ans bras ni jambes [et] être amputé soudain de bien des membres.” 
16 “[N]ous sommes faits pour vivre dans la compagnie de l’orang-outan, sur un territoire 
où nous partageons les tâches, où nous échangeons services et compétences, dans une 
interaction constante. Nos destins sont liés de toute éternité. Si l’un de nous manque, 
l’autre du même coup perd la moitié de ses membres tandis que double sa besogne. Voilà 
l’hémiplégique mis à écosser les petits pois.” 
17 “Notre corps expérimente toutes les façons d’être infirme, il y en a.”
18 On this point, see Richter as well as Stead 296-327.
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nose, there is no one but me within my reach”19 (17); “a body full of pain, 
as if our hands couldn’t but wring each other and our teeth couldn’t but 
crack our teeth”20 (35). The first person (singular and plural) refers to both 
a grammatical subject and a grammatical object, while the text describes 
such a first-person-omnipresence as the product of a loss. Sans l’orang-outan 
thus depicts a genuine anthropo-egocentric narrowing down of the self, reter-
ritorialized within the circumscribed boundaries of single body: 
But here we are, limited to short movements, to movements close to the body, 
to self-care. As far as I stretch my arms, I cannot but touch myself again, stroke 
myself, polish myself…. This body of mine that was opening up spaces for me is 
now crawling, it does not get out of its rut anymore. Formerly, it seemed to me 
that I could leave my body behind, my reach was large enough so that I would 
keep the distance and be able to look and wander elsewhere. I was scratching 
other backs than my own….21 (158)
Having lost its ties to others and its ecosystemic “reach,” the protagonist 
becomes static. The name he is given—“Moindre,” which means “smaller, 
reduced” in French—ultimately confirms his status as the monstrous outcome 
of a disjunctive anthropogenesis that in fact allows the narrative figuration. 
Here, literary representation is achieved through the tearing apart of what 
was once unseparated, arousing “dread” (“effroi”; 23) and “horrified aston-
ishment” (“stupeur horrifiée”; 35). The text implicates the traditional poetics 
of the novel which distinguish between human and nonhuman characters as 
a prerequisite, yet simultaneously discloses these poetics as corrupt. 
In this respect, the last part of the text is worth mentioning. Although the 
text finally focuses on Moindre and a few acolytes seeking a way to resurrect 
orangutans in the human body by embracing ethological modes of existence 
similar to those of the orangutans (an arboreal way of life, brachiation, a 
frugivorous diet and so on), success will come not from these attempts—
which the narrative voice derides—but from another nonhuman animal, 
namely a tiger. At some point, Moindre decides to unleash a tiger on his 
19 “Je peux me gifler, me tordre le nez, il n’y a plus que moi à portée de ma main.”
20 “[U]n corps de douleur, comme si nos mains ne savaient plus que se tordre l’une l’autre, 
et nos dents briser nos dents.” 
21 “Mais nous voici réduits aux gestes courts, aux gestes près du corps, au soin de soi. Si loin 
que j’étende le bras, je ne peux que me tâter encore, me caresser, me polir…. Ce corps 
qui m’ouvrait l’espace se traîne, il ne sort plus de son ornière. Avant, il me semble que je 
laissais parfois ma dépouille derrière moi, j’avais assez d’allonge pour tenir la distance et 
aller voir ailleurs. Je grattais d’autres dos que le mien….” 
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fellows as a test to reveal how good they prove as orangutans, and the feline 
devours half of the troupe. Moindre then ironically takes the outcome as a 
success of those who died, offering the following laudatory eulogy for them: 
“[T]he tiger regarded you as equal to an orangutans group. He didn’t see any 
substantial difference. His deadly attack also stands as a tribute to our efforts 
and results, you can legitimately feel honored”22 (179, emphasis added). 
Under the veil of humor, an earnest discourse about the myth of human 
distinction and its process of self-validation can be recognized. Following 
Darwin’s argument that “if man had not been his own classifier, he would 
never have thought of founding a separate order for his own reception” 
(191), the shift in perspective from human to tiger eliminates the possibility 
of discrimination between species. From the point of view of the tiger who ate 
the character named Karpoff “like he would have done with an orangutan, 
starting with the middle and the flanks and without expressing any surprise 
or repugnance”23 (181), human beings are just apes whose meat is the same 
as—and is confused with—that of orangutans. On a symbolical level, the 
nonhuman animal then appears as a repository figure of an unprompted, 
undifferentiated view on life and living creatures, which not only dismisses 
human exceptionalism but also allegorically enables human protagonists to 
revive their lost solidarity with the extinct apes. In other words, the tiger’s 
ontology does not make a difference, thus enabling a  pattern of indiscrete 
permeability to find its way back into the poetics of the text. 
Furthermore, confusion ends up spreading in the minds of the survivors. 
As they carry out efforts to become orangutans and because of the absence 
of the original model, they happen to forget which behaviors were alleg-
edly specific to great apes and which were specific to human beings: “And 
now everything gets clouded and blurry and we cannot judge anything 
anymore”24 (183). Such a global loss of discernment then infects not only 
the narrator of the text but also the disoriented reader, ultimately proving 
Chevillard’s poetics if not Moindre’s anthropo-zoomorphic enterprise as an 
effective project.
22 “[L]e tigre vous a considérés à l’égal d’un groupe d’orang-outans. Il n’a point perçu de différence 
significative. Sa charge meurtrière est aussi un hommage à nos efforts et à nos résultats, 
vous pouvez à bon droit vous sentir honorés.”
23 “[C]omme il eût fait d’un orang-outang, en commençant par le centre et les flancs et sans 
marquer de surprise ou de dégoût.” 
24 “Voilà que tout se brouille et s’embrouille et nous ne pouvons plus juger de rien.”
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Conclusion
Chevillard’s text ultimately points towards a poetics likely to endorse a genu-
ine ecological view on animated life as yet-to-come. Nonetheless, other works 
might have been examined which are less aporetic. The experiment with 
a loss of boundaries Clarice Lispector depicts in her protagonist’s meeting 
with a cockroach in A Paixão segundo G.H (1964); Kurt Vonnegut’s fantasies 
of a devolution process undoing disjunctive anthropogenesis in Galápagos 
(1985); Jim Crace’s depiction of an immanent afterlife through ecological 
transubstantiation in Being Dead (1999): all these works strive to highlight 
and narrate the prominence of ecological connections between all living 
organisms. By doing so, they provide convincing examples of how the so-
called “animal question” can be raised from an ecological perspective, and 
encourage us, as critics, not to think of the two fields of zoo- and eco-poetics 
as separated ones.
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